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CHAPTER 2 8 
Legal Reasoning 
Phoebe C. Ellsworth 
For more than a century, lawyers have writ-
ten about legal reasoning, and the flow of 
books and articles describing, analyzing, and 
reformulating the topic continues unabated. 
The volume and persistence of this "unre-
lenting discussion" (Simon, 1998, p. 4) sug-
gests that there is no solid consensus about 
what legal reasoning is. Legal scholars have 
a tenacious intuition - or at least a strong 
hope - that legal reasoning is distinctive, 
that it is not the same as logic, or scientific 
reasoning, or ordinary decision making, and 
there have been dozens of attempts to de-
scribe what it is that sets it apart from these 
other forms of thinking. These attempts gen-
erate criticism, the critics devise new formu-
lations that generate further criticism, and 
the process continues. In this chapter, I de-
scribe the primary forms of legal reason-
ing, the most important schools of thought 
about legal reasoning, and some of the ma-
jor differences between legal reasoning and 
scientific reasoning. 
The first question is, "Whose legal reason-
ing are we talking about?" Jurors are given 
instructions on the law at the end of every 
trial and are asked to apply that law to the 
evidence they've heard to reach a verdict. 
They are asked to engage in "legal reason-
ing." Clients approach their attorneys with 
rambling stories and a strong, if somewhat 
vague, sense of injustice, and it is the at-
torney's job to figure out the laws, prece-
dents, and facts that most favor the client 
and to integrate them into a persuasive case. 
This task involves legal reasoning, but the 
reasoning is driven by the desired outcome. 
The goal is not to reach the right decision 
but to make the best argument for one side. 
The evidence, as orchestrated by the lawyers 
and the legal arguments they make, form 
the raw materials for the judge's decision, al-
though judges (like juries) may also draw on 
their own background knowledge and expe-
rience and their own interpretations of the 
evidence and (unlike juries) their own un-
derstanding of the law. 
When scholars write about "legal reason-
ing," they are writing about judges. The 
lawyer does not have to decide the case, 
but only to make the strongest appeal for 
one side; lawyers' reasoning is discussed in 
courses and writings on advocacy. Jurors in-
terpret the evidence to decide what actually 
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happened and apply the law given to them 
in the judge's instructions to reach a verdict. 
The judge must also seek out the appropri-
ate legal authority, deciding which laws and 
previous cases are applicable. Jurors are not 
supposed to reason about the law itself; that 
is the task of the judge. Judges are trained in 
the law, they know the statutes and prece-
dents, and they have the experience of judg-
ing many cases and reading the decisions of 
other judges. Jurors do not provide reasons 
for their verdicts; judges often do. Finally, 
much of what is written about legal rea-
soning is about appellate court decisions, in 
which judges are primarily concerned with 
legal procedure and the law itself, not about 
who wins and loses, and in which they al-
most always must provide legal explanations 
for their decisions. 
In the subsequent historical section, I de-
scribe how basic visions of the nature of le-
gal reasoning have changed over time. Most 
judges, if they thought about their thought 
processes at all, have probably accepted the 
commonsense background theory prevalent 
in the legal culture of their era. Some, how-
ever, including some of the greatest judges, 
have recognized that they really can't ex-
plain how they reach decisions (Holmes, 
1897; and cf. Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). In 
1921, Benjamin Cardozo began his classic 
work, The Nature of the Judicial Process, with 
the observation that" [A ]ny judge, one might 
suppose, would find it easy to describe the 
process which he had followed a thousand 
times and more. Nothing could be farther 
from the truth" (1921, p. 9). 
But that does not mean there are no com-
monly accepted characteristics of legal rea-
soning. There are. The problem that vexes 
legal scholars is that they are incomplete. 
Although they undoubtedly influence judi-
cial reasoning, they are insufficient either 
to predict future outcomes or to provide 
a fully satisfactory account for past ones. 
The two most common reasoning strate-
gies, taught in every law school course on 
legal reasoning and writing, are the deduc-
tive method (rule-based reasoning) and the 
analogical method (case-based reasoning). 
These strategies are not unique to legal rea-
soning. They are commonly described in re-
lation to scientific reasoning as well. What is 
distinctive about these forms of reasoning in 
the legal context is not so much the process 
but the context, the raw materials to which 
the processes are applied, and the nature of 
the rules. 
Deductive and Analogical Reasoning 
in Law 
Deductive (Rule-Based) Reasoning 
In deductive scientific reasoning (see Dun-
bar & Fugelsang, Chap. 29), there is a gen-
eral law or theory, and the scientist uses that 
theory to infer what will happen in some 
particular fact situation, makes a prediction, 
and designs an experiment to test it. If the 
prediction is not confirmed, there are three 
possibilities: The deduction was flawed, 
the experiment was flawed, or the theory 
is flawed. In deductive legal reasoning, the 
decision maker begins with a specific set of 
facts, looks at the law that applies to those 
facts, and reaches a verdict. If Joe's Liquor 
Store sells beer to 16-year-old Richard, and 
there is a law prohibiting the sale of alco-
hol to anyone under the age of 21, then Joe's 
Liquor Store is guilty. The reasoning is ba-
sically syllogistic, and in many cases the ap-
plication of the law is unproblematic (see 
Evans, Chap. 8). These are called easy cases. 
In practice, there are many ways in 
which ambiguity can creep into this appar-
ently clear logical process. First, the decision 
maker is faced with a specific set of facts. If 
he or she is a judge, there are almost always 
two versions of the facts. It is the attorneys' 
job to organize the facts in a way that fits the 
legal outcome they wish to achieve, and they 
do this by emphasizing different facts and, 
often, different legal precedents. "[T]he law 
determines which facts are relevant while at 
the same time, the facts determine which 
law is relevant" (Burton, 1995, p. 141 ). There 
may be more than one law that is poten-
tially applicable. There may be several statu-
tory provisions that might be relevant, and 
the two opposing counsel may argue that a 
LEGAL REASONING 
different rule is the one that should con-
trol this case. The statute itself may violate a 
higher rule, such as the state or federal con-
stitution. The rule may be ambiguous, as in 
a ban on "excessive noise," or the application 
of the "reasonable person" standard ("Would 
a reasonable person have believed that her 
life was in danger?"). 
In preparing a case, an attorney will go 
back and forth between developing a co-
herent version of the facts that fits the law 
and conducting legal research to find out 
which laws frame the facts in the best pos-
sible way. The judge, faced with two com-
peting arguments, may choose one of them, 
or may bring in additional factual interpreta-
tions or legal considerations not mentioned 
by either of the parties. Thus, even the ap-
parently simplest form of legal reasoning -
deciding whether the law covers the specific 
fact situation- is often quite complicated in 
practice. The commonsense idea that there is 
a behavior, there is a law, and the ques-
tion is "Does the behavior conform to the 
law?" is much too simple to apply to interes-
ting cases. 
Analogical (Case-Based) Reasoning 
In the Anglo-American common law 
tradition, 1 cases are decided by examining 
the patterns of decisions in earlier, related 
cases. No case has meaning in isolation, 
and general rules and propositions are 
useless without "the heaping up of concrete 
instances" (Llewellyn, 1930, p. z), except in 
very simple cases. A somewhat similar form 
of reasoning occurs in science when a scien-
tist examines a series of studies with appar-
ently inconsistent results and tries to come 
up with a general principle that will explain 
the inconsistencies. In research on social 
facilitation, for example, some researchers 
found that people performed better on a task 
when other people were around, but other 
researchers found that people performed 
better when they were alone. In 196 5, 
Robert Zajonc resolved this controversy by 
showing that the emotional arousal caused 
by the presence of others enhanced perfor-
mance on well-learned tasks but impaired 
performance on tasks that were less familiar. 
He applied a more general principle that 
explained the apparently contradictory re-
sults of past research and made sense of the 
field. He then went on to devise a situation 
in which the new principle could be tested. 
The judge begins where the scientist ends, 
with a specific situation in which the out-
come must be decided - not predicted and 
tested but decided by examining the sim-
ilarities and differences between this new 
case and the previous cases and choosing an 
outcome that corresponds to the holdings 
of the cases it most resembles. In the ad-
versarial system, the lawyers emphasize the 
prior cases that were decided the way they 
want this one to be decided, finding crucial 
differences in the prior cases that went the 
"wrong way" so as to argue that their hold-
ings are inapplicable in the present context. 
The lawyers have a certain leeway in their se-
lection of which facts to emphasize, in their 
interpretation of the facts, and in their de-
scription of the legal significance of those 
facts (Llewellyn, 1930, p. 70). Like the scien-
tist, the lawyer may identify some principle 
that explains why the current case should 
be considered an example of the first group 
rather than the second. The judge examines 
the strengths and weaknesses of the argu-
ments of the two parties and either chooses 
between them or develops a different princi-
ple for placing the present case in the context 
of the past ones. 
When legal educators claim that the basic 
mission of the first year of law school is to 
train the student to "think like a lawyer," it 
is this sort of analogical reasoning they gen-
erally have in mind - the ability to spot the 
factual and legal similarities and (more im-
portant) differences between the case un-
der study and related previous cases and 
to recognize which similarities and differ-
ences are relevant (e.g., the defendant's state 
of mind) and which are not (e.g., the de-
fendant's name). This entails defining the 
universe of possibly applicable cases and de-
ciding which ones match the current case 
most closely and which, although apparently 
similar, do not apply. The focus is on the 
particular cases, and the reasoning is more 
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like feature matching than like the applica-
tion of a general principle (Sunstein, 1996, 
p. 67; see Holyoak, Chap. 6, for further dis-
cussion of analogical reasoning). 
Finally, as with deductive reasoning, the 
significance of a particular fact depends on 
its legal significance, and the significance 
of a particular law or previous holding de-
pends on the exact fact pattern of the 
case. The legal reasoner must consider both 
simultaneously. 
Theories of Legal Reasoning 
Formalisnf 
That "legal reasoning" is considered to be a 
distinctive form of reasoning worthy of be-
ing included as a separate topic in the Cam-
bridge Handbook on Thinking and Reasoning 
is attributable in large measure to Christo-
pher Columbus Langdell, who became the 
first Dean of the Harvard Law School in 
1870, and who revolutionized legal educa-
tion. He introduced the case-based tech-
nique of teaching law; he created the image 
of the law faculty as a group of perma-
nent scholars devoted to legal research, 
explicitly promoting the analogy to the fac-
ulty of a science department; and he advo-
cated a view of legal reasoning known as "le-
gal formalism." 
The essence of legal formalism is the idea 
that "a few basic top-level categories and 
principles formed a conceptually ordered 
system above a large number ofbottom-level 
rules. The rules themselves were, ideally, the 
holdings of established precedents, which 
upon analysis could be seen to be discovered 
from the principles" (Grey, 1983, p. u). In 
other words, there is a pyramid of rules with 
a very few fundamental "first principles" at 
the top, from which mid-level and finally a 
large number of specific rules could be de-
rived. The legal decision maker, faced with 
a case to be decided, would study the body 
of law and discover the rule that determined 
the correct result. 
In 1870, science represented the pin-
nacle of human intellectual achievement, 
and in his effort to make law an academic 
discipline rather than a mere trade, Lang dell 
embraced the idea that law is a science 
(Langdell, 188o ). He did not originate this 
view, which can be found in Blackstone's 
Commentaries and earlier (Kennedy, 1 9 7 3), 
but he promulgated it enthusiastically. An 
obvious problem with this analogy is that 
in law there is no means of experimenta-
tion, no access to previously unknown data. 
The "data" consisted of the writings of ear-
lier judges: "We have constantly inculcated 
the idea that the library is the proper work-
shop of professors and students alike; that it 
is to us all that the laboratories of the uni-
versity are to the chemists and physicists, the 
museum of natural history to the zoologists, 
and the botanical gardens to the botanists 
(Langdell, 1887, p. 124; emphasis added). 
The data were what judges had said, and new 
data were what new judges said, based on 
their readings of their predecessors. Langdell 
did not argue that law as it existed actually 
achieved the beautiful hierarchical organi-
zation from clear, highly abstract principles 
down to lower levels that would finally allow 
precise derivations that would fit any new set 
of particular facts; creating such an arrange-
ment was a goal of legal science. 
Of course this view of science as a closed 
deductive system strikes most modern sci-
entists as unrealistic and simplistic - a view 
of science that we were taught in eighth 
grade but that rarely seems like a descrip-
tion of what we actually do or how we 
actually think. The behavioral sciences espe-
cially (and it seems natural to us that if law 
is to be considered a science at all it should 
be a behavioral science) seem a poor fit for 
such an abstract deductive model of reason-
ing. Evenin187o, theexcitementofobserva-
tion, empiricism, and induction were rapidly 
replacing earlier deductive views of science. 
Langdell's model of science was more like 
the taxonomic system of Linnaeus than like 
empirical science. Families of plants and an-
imals were organized under phyla (the fun-
damental principles), genera under families, 
and species under genera. During the explo-
rations of the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies, an astonishing variety of new plant 
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and animal species was discovered, and each 
one could be compared with others at the 
species level and classified appropriately in 
its place in the ruling structure. In the same 
way, each new legal case could be examined 
for its similarities and differences to previ-
ously decided cases, which in turn had been 
classified according to the general taxon-
omy, and so could be decided accurately. In 
law, "the fundamental principles of common 
law were discerned by induction from cases, 
rules of law were then derived from princi-
ples conceptually, and, finally, cases were de-
cided, also conceptually, from rules" (Grey, 
1983, 19)· 
There were critics oflegal formalism from 
the very beginning. The alternative view is il-
lustrated in two famous remarks by Oliver 
Wendell Homes, Jr.: "The life of the law 
has not been logic: It has been experience" 
(Holmes, 1 8 81, p. 1), and "general princi-
ples do not decide concrete cases" (dissent-
ing opinion in Lochner v. New York, 190 5, p. 
76). Holmes and, later, critics such as Pound, 
Llewellyn, and Cardozo argued that legal 
principles were not "discovered" by careful 
research into the rules and principles, and 
that such research, however diligent, would 
not yield definite and incontrovertible an-
swers in any but the easiest cases. Instead of 
clear distinctions between the cases decided 
in one way and those decided in the other 
(for the plaintiff or the defendant in a med-
ical malpractice case, for example), there is 
overlap and fuzziness at the boundary and, 
in the end, the judge creates the defining dis-
tinction rather than discovering it (Cardozo, 
1921, p. 167). The distinctions were often 
arbitrary, not logical, and influenced by the 
judge's own sense of what the right outcome 
should be. The fundamental principles and 
legal rules were important and provided con-
siderable guidance to the judge but, in most 
cases, they were insufficient to determine 
the outcome. The certainty and sense of in-
evitability expressed in judicial opinions was 
quite unjustified. As time goes by and the 
legal landscape becomes dense with more 
and more intermediate cases, the failures of 
formalism become increasingly apparent. As 
Holmes put it 
Two widely different cases suggest a general 
distinction which is a clear one when stated 
broadly. But as new cases cluster around 
the opposite poles, and begin to approach 
each other, the distinction becomes more dif-
ficult to trace; the determinations are made 
one way or the other on a very slight pre-
ponderance of feeling, rather than articu-
late reason; and at last a mathematical 
line is amved at by the contact of contrary 
decisions, which is so far arbitrary that it 
might equally well have been drawn a little 
further the one side or the other (Holmes, 
1873, p. 652). 
Although the idealistic theory behind 
formalism has largely been abandoned ( c£ 
Kennedy, 1973; Gordon, 1984; Grey, 1983; 
Simon, 1998 ), its categories and its ana-
lytic methods persist. Its classifications are 
still robust - substantive versus procedural 
law; contracts, torts, property. They deter-
mine how the first year of law school is 
structured. No comprehensive new organi-
zational scheme has replaced the categories 
of formalism, and they therefore continue to 
"influence judgment much as the agenda for 
a meeting influences the results of its delib-
erations" (Grey, 1983, p. so). 
The tenets of legal formalism still ex-
ercise a strong influence on the way judi-
cial opinions are written. Decisions typically 
are presented as the inevitable consequence 
of a careful analysis of the facts and 
the applicable law based on the classifi-
cation of this case in relation to previous 
cases. The correct decision and the govern-
ing principles are described as discovered, 
not created, by the judge (Schauer, 199 5, 
p. 642, note 23), and are expressed with 
great certainty, as though there were no 
room for doubt. "It seems that this neo-
formalist form of jurisprudence - typified 
by a self-reported experience of constraint, 
high confidence and singular correctness, 
all couched in the rhetoric of closure - is 
the predominant, albeit unofficial, mode of 
judicial reasoning in current American legal 
culture" (Simon, 1998, p. 11 ). In part, this 
persistence is attributable to the strong be-
lief that the law requires stability. For peo-
ple to have faith in the legal system, judges' 
THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING 
decisions must be predictable, and for judges 
to make predictable, logical decisions there 
must be a fixed framework from which 
those decisions are derived. A major differ-
ence between law and science, as discussed 
subsequently, is that uncertainty and change 
are a sign of a healthy scientific climate; 
they would definitely not signal a healthy 
legal climate. 
Legal Realism 
Legal realism arose in opposition to formal-
ism and can be seen as an extension and elab-
oration of Holmes's early skepticism. Legal 
realists rejected the formalist ideas that the 
law was a self-contained logical system pro-
viding for the scientific, deductive derivation 
of the right answer in all new cases. They 
regarded this view as a vain daydream dis-
connected from the real world influences on 
legal decision makers -hence the label "legal 
realism." 
In a strict formalist analysis, two different 
judges should always judge the same case 
in the same way unless one of them was 
mistaken in his3 understanding of the facts 
or the law. Clearly this was not the case. 
In the nineteenth century, as now, courts 
were often divided. There were judges in 
the majority and there were dissenters, and 
no one seriously argued that the dissenters 
were incompetent or in need of retraining. 
Of course the formalists did not believe this 
was the way the world really worked, but 
they did believe that the legal system could 
approximate that ideal and that it was an 
ideal worth striving for. The legal realists be-
lieved that it was an impossible ideal and that 
it was a waste of time to strive for it. 
According to the legal realists, instead of 
reflecting an abstract set of nearly immutable 
principles, the law reflects historical, social, 
cultural, political, economic, and psycholog-
ical forces, and the behavior of individual 
legal decision makers is a product of these 
forces. It therefore is not surprising that dif-
ferent judges, with different goals and back-
grounds, should decide cases differently, and 
contrary decisions do not imply that some 
judges must be "wrong." 
The first move toward legal realism was 
"Sociological Jurisprudence," which was ex-
pounded most explicitly by Roscoe Pound 
(1912). Like Holmes, Pound felt that the 
"mechanical jurisprudence" of the formal-
ists was out of touch with social real-
ity and that legal scholarship and judicial 
norms were standing still, out of touch with 
exciting developments in philosophy and, 
particularly, the social sciences. "Jurispru-
dence," he argued, "is the last in the march 
of sciences away from the method of de-
duction from predetermined conceptions" 
(Pound, 1909, p. 464). The strict doctrinal 
approach blinded legal writers to two essen-
tial considerations: first, the purposes of the 
law - the goal of doing justice rather than 
following the letter of the law; and second, 
the social, cultural, and psychological factors 
that influenced behavior, including the be-
havior oflawmakers and judges. Blind adher-
ence to the abstract law-on-the-books might 
make for greater certainty and predictability, 
but "reasonable and just solutions of individ-
ual cases" were "too often sacrificed" (Pound, 
1912, p. 51 5). The law treated all individuals 
as equivalent regardless of their social back-
ground or position. Thus, for example, the 
right of an employee to quit was legally the 
same as the right of the employer to fire him. 
Both were free agents enjoying the "liberty of 
contract." But of course the employer could 
easily find another employee, but the em-
ployee would have lost his livelihood and 
might have a very hard time finding another 
job. The law's refusal to acknowledge these 
obvious social truths was a major stimulus to 
sociological jurisprudence. 
Pound argued that legal scholarship and 
judicial decisions should "take more ac-
count, and more intelligent account, of the 
social facts upon which law must proceed 
and to which it is to be applied" (1912, 
p. 51 3). The focus should not be on the ab-
stract content of the laws but on how they 
actually work. It is important to consider 
the purpose of laws and to modify them if 
these purposes are not being achieved. And 
judges should regard the law as suggestive 
rather than determinative of their decisions: 
If strict application of the law would result 
in an outcome that is unjust or contrary to 
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the purpose of the law, then flexibility in the 
cause of justice is appropriate. 
The basic views of Holmes and Pound 
were quite similar - pragmatic and open-
minded. Pound, however, was a far stronger 
proponent of an interdisciplinary solution 
to the problems of formalism. The social 
sciences were very much on the rise at 
the beginning of the twentieth century and 
seemed "progressive" in a way that law was 
not. Their ideas stretched the imaginations 
of the more intellectually curious law pro-
fessors and challenged some of the most 
fundamental assumptions of the law. The so-
ciologists (the most influential group) sug-
gested that the equality of all assumed by 
the law (e.g., the "liberty of contract") was a 
myth because status and power significantly 
affected a person's choices, the anthropolo-
gists revealed a wide range of peaceful so-
cieties with entirely different kinds of legal 
systems, and psychologists raised questions 
about the essential legal concepts of free will 
and responsibility, suggesting that behavior 
was determined by psychological and social 
factors beyond the control of the individual 
(Green, 1995). 
The period identified as the flowering 
of legal realism was the period between 
the wars (Fisher, Horwitz, & Reed, 1993). 
Holmes and Pound were the inspirational 
figures from the past,4 but now there were 
enough like-minded scholars so they could 
legitimately be called a "school" or a "move-
ment," although never an organization. Like 
the cognitive psychologists who shook off 
the shackles of behaviorism in the 196os and 
197os, they were an eclectic group united 
mainly by their opposition to the old ways. 
Some tried to do empirical research, some 
were political activists (and some eventually 
became part of the New Deal government), 
some continued as legal scholars but preach-
ing a new faith, and some were articulate 
gadflies. Some were and are highly respected 
figures in the history of legal scholarship, 
some were but are no longer, and some were 
always seen as fringe elements. 
As with their predecessors, their primary 
unifying theme was a rejection of the old 
ways and a passionate belief that legal doc-
trine played a limited role in legal decision 
making - and that that was how it should 
be. Karl Llewellyn, one of the most impor-
tant figures in the group, argued that law was 
about "disputes to be settled and disputes to 
be prevented" (1930, p. 2), not about rules; 
about what legal decision makers do, not 
what they say. Legal rules were regarded as, 
at best, post hoc justifications and, at worst, 
criteria that could lead judges to unjust de-
cisions. Advocates in a trial could usually 
describe the facts and the law so as to pro-
duce coherent, complete, persuasive argu-
ments for two diametrically opposite con-
clusions. Llewellyn even wrote an article on 
statutory interpretation showing that each 
of 2 8 basic legal propositions could be ar-
gued either way: "A statute cannot go beyond 
its text"/"To effect a purpose a statute may 
be implemented beyond its text"; "Where 
design has been distinctly stated no place 
is left for construction"/"Courts have the 
power to inquire into real- as distinct from 
ostensible - purposes" (Llewellyn, 1950, 
pp. 401, 403)-
The agenda of the legal realists was both 
descriptive and prescriptive. According to 
Felix Cohen, "Fundamentally, there are only 
two significant questions in the field of law. 
One is, 'How do courts actually decide cases 
of a given kind?' The other is, 'How ought 
they to decide cases of a given kind?'"( 19 3 5, 
p. 824). The answer to the descriptive ques-
tion was that courts do not decide cases on 
the basis of laws because the law always 
allows for multiple answers. In considering 
what sort of forces do influence case out-
comes, different scholars emphasized social 
and cultural forces (Cohen, 19 3 5; Lasswell, 
1930; Yntema, 1928), unconscious psycho-
logical drives (Frank, 19 3 o), or just a pro-
cess of intuition that eventually culminated 
in a Gestalt-like "Aha effect" after long ru-
mination (Hutcheson, 1929). These influ-
ences affect the assessment of the actual 
facts of the case - the credibility of the 
witnesses, the plausibility of the stories, as 
well as the judge's "sense of how the law 
ought to respond to these facts" (Fisher, Hor-
witz, & Reed, 1993, p. 165). Legal real-
ists were ridiculed as believing that judicial 
decisions depended on what the judge ate 
for breakfast. However, the realists generally 
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did not believe that judicial decisions were 
idiosyncratic or unpredictable. "Law is not 
a mass of unrelated decisions nor a prod-
uct of judicial bellyaches. Judges are hu-
man, but they are a particular breed of 
humans, selected to a type and held to ser-
vice under a potent system of governmen-
tal controls" (Cohen, I 93 5, p. 843). Because 
most judges come from the same social class, 
receive the same legal education, and are 
subject to the same social and historical in-
fluences and the same role demands, their 
decisions will resemble each other. 
The intellectual enterprise of legal schol-
arship, therefore, should be to describe the 
actual behavior of courts, taking account of 
the broader social context. The realists were 
confident that this behavior would not be 
predictable from written legal doctrine or 
statutes. Instead, the legal rules and con-
cepts would turn out to be consequences, 
rather than causes, of judges' behavior. To 
understand how judges reach their decisions, 
it is important to analyze their social back-
grounds, previous experience, and role de-
mands and the general political, social, and 
economic pressures of the times. Because 
these same forces affected the behavior of 
the parties of the case, the relation between 
the judge's position in society and that of the 
litigants should also be explored. This gen-
eral set of ideas was easy to demonstrate in 
particular cases. Then, as now, the opinions 
of individual judges on particular issues were 
often easy to predict. Defense lawyers "shop" 
for judges known to be sympathetic to of-
fenders who resemble their client (judges 
who believe that drug laws are too harsh, for 
example). On some issues, it is easy to pre-
dict Supreme Court Justices' positions based 
on their previous opinions and their general 
ideology. Coming up with a more general 
mid-level theory, something between vague 
abstract statements about "social forces" and 
predictions of what a particular judge would 
say in a particular case, was a much greater 
challenge and one the realists never actually 
accomplished. 
The description of what courts actually 
do was supposed to explore not only the 
causes of judicial decisions but also their 
consequences. A study of consequences is es-
sential to answer the second question, "How 
ought [courts] to decide cases of a particular 
kind?" Judicial decisions affect human be-
havior, often favoring one group's interests 
over another, and they affect future judicial 
decisions. Careful study of these conse-
quences would allow for better-informed ju-
dicial decisions and better laws. 
Prescriptively, the realists argued first that 
in applying the law, judges ought to con-
sider the purpose of the law and, second, 
that they should focus on the particulars 
of the case and compare it with the partic-
ulars of preceding cases, rather than look-
ing for broad general principles. Consid-
eration of the purposes of the law was 
supposed to enhance the fairness and the 
consistency of decisions, and blind applica-
tion to the rule without considering its pur-
pose would lead to bad decisions (Llewellyn, 
1942). To facilitate this approach, legisla-
tors and judges should make the reasons 
for the law explicit; to provide appropri-
ate guidance to future judges: "Only the 
rule which shows its reason on its face has 
ground to claim maximum chance of contin-
uingeffectiveness" (Llewellyn, 1942, p. 26o). 
Because social conditions were constantly 
changing, however, judges should be free 
to revise and reject even rules with clearly 
stated purposes; the development of law, 
like the development of science, should be 
a never-ending process of examination and 
re-examination. 
Specific comparisons of the particular 
case to be decided and the facts of related 
cases, through analogical reasoning, was the 
preferred method. Just as a case read by it-
self is meaningless (Llewellyn, 1930, p. 49), 
a case read with reference to the law and 
without reference to other cases was also 
meaningless. Close factual comparisons will 
reveal the empirically grounded rules and 
cultural beliefs that actually explain legal 
decisions because "legal rules are simply for-
mulae describing uniformities of judicial de-
cision" (Cohen, 1935, p. 848). Some ofthe 
realists believed that close examination of 
the prior body of cases required more than a 
reading of the cases alone. Some felt that an 
education in social science was necessary to 
fully understand the social forces influencing 
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the parties and the judge. Others felt that 
legal researchers should create databases on 
the background of judges and their decisions, 
the frequency with which laws on the books 
were actually enforced, whether they are en-
forced against some groups more than oth-
ers, whether patterns of enforcement have 
changed over time (e.g., obscenity laws), and 
so on. 
The legal realists have been identified 
with a "social science" point of view, but this 
meant different things to different scholars. 
Most of them probably shared Pound's be-
lief that, although other scientific disciplines 
were making huge progress, law was stag-
nating, backwards looking, and clinging to a 
static, deductive model that had been aban-
doned by other sciences. The law, because it 
deals with ever-changing values, opportuni-
ties, and norms of behavior should keep pace 
with these changes. Most also were some-
what shaken by the ways in which sociology 
and psychology were undermining the no-
tion of free will central to the law (Green, 
199 5). Most of them agreed that the focus of 
attention should be on how judges think, not 
on the written rules. They were fairly unified 
in describing what was wrong with formalism 
but never fully agreed on the remedies and, 
indeed, proposed very few. 
Beyond this general sense that the law 
should develop as society develops and 
take general account of progress in the so-
cial sciences, the realists followed different 
paths. Some more or less stopped there. 
For others, the "critical realists" in Horwitz's 
( 1992) terminology, social science mainly 
meant a concern with social policy. Politi-
cally they were progressives, and flourished 
under the New Deal. Cardozo, Brandeis, 
Frankfurter, and Douglas followed Holmes 
to the Supreme Court, and several others 
moved to important positions in the New 
Deal administration. For them, the social sci-
ence that mattered was the sociologists' em-
phasis on social class and a generally socialist 
view of what should guide the government 
and the courts. For them, as for many of the 
social scientists of the time, social science 
meant social activism. 
Another group, the "constructive real-
ists" (Horwitz, 1992), believed that legal 
scholars should collect detailed statistical 
information about the causes and conse-
quences of various rules, conducting in-
terdisciplinary empirical research, and that 
courts should consider social science data 
in deciding cases. The method of mar-
shaling social scientific evidence in argu-
ing a case was pioneered by Louis Brandeis 
and Josephine Goldmark in the famous 
"Brandeis brief'' inMullerv. Oregon (208 U.S. 
412). In arguing that it was constitution-
ally permissible to restrict women's work-
ing hours to ten hours a day, they presented 
hundreds of excerpts from various articles 
and reports claiming that long working hours 
were damaging to women's health. Most of 
these were not actually scientific reports, but 
they were an effort (successful) to force the 
court to consider the social facts involved 
in the legal question and the social conse-
quences of the decision. The "Brandeis brief" 
is legendary, and the inclusion of social sci-
ence research in legal arguments is now com-
mon. Modern trial and appellate courts rou-
tinely consider social science data, although 
their actual influence is probably less than 
most social scientists would like to believe 
(Ellsworth & Getman, 1986). 
There were some efforts to compile 
databases (Pound and Frankfurter, 1922; and 
c£ Schlegel, 1 9 8 o) and a few attempts to ac-
tually carry out systematic research projects. 
However, these attempts generally failed to 
achieve the grand purposes their authors had 
in mind. In writing a traditional law review 
article, the author typically knows what the 
conclusion is at the beginning; empirical re-
search, as any honest scientist knows, often 
forces agonizing rethinking and sometimes 
produces data so ambiguous that nothing 
can be concluded. So, in 1928, the future 
Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas 
conducted a study of business failures de-
signed to produce revolutionary insights but 
ended up with two small, inconclusive arti-
cles (Fisher, Horwitz, & Reed, 199 3, p. 2 3 3). 
Underhill Moore, a Yale law professor in one 
of the three experimental law and social sci-
ence interdisciplinary programs, attempted 
a behaviorist (Hullian) analysis of the ef-
fects of parking tickets (Moore and Callahan, 
194 3) that provoked intense ridicule even 
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from other realists [Llewellyn later called it 
"the nadir of idiocy" (1956, p. 4oo)]. Em-
pirical research by legal scholars has slowly 
increased over the past 5o or 6o years, but 
at the time, the admonishments of the le-
gal realists only produced a brief spate of at-
tempts, nothing like a major change in orien-
tation. It is still the case that some law pro-
fessors regard empirical research as mindless 
and mechanical with data a crutch for those 
whose mental capacities are insufficient to 
reach the truth on their own. 
Although the excesses of Legal Realism 
are still parodied in well-worn cliches (such 
as the "what the judge had for breakfast" 
cliche), in the main, it has been absorbed 
into American legal thought; thus, only the 
excesses stand out as distinctive. Close com-
parison of cases is the standard method of 
legal education, and consideration of the 
social context, purposes, and policy impli-
cations of the law is common. The chal-
lenge posed by the realists - the relative 
role of law versus social and personal con-
siderations - still looms over the study of 
law and defines the questions. Databases 
are everywhere, especially in the criminal 
justice system, but also in the civil arena. 
The American Bar Association regularly pro-
poses guidelines based on statistical data as 
do government commissions. No one still 
believes in strict Langdellian formalism, al-
though many law courses are an uneasy 
blend of formalism and the considerations 
raised by the legal realists, and judicial opin-
ions are written in formalist language. And 
the later developments of legal realism, al-
though never quite mainstream, are thriv-
ing. In 19 3 5, Felix Cohen wrote that "It is 
reasonable to expect that some day even 
the impudencies of Holmes and Llewellyn 
will appear sage and respectable" ( 19 3 5, 
p. 84 7 ), and that prophecy has certainly 
come true. 
Critical Legal Studies, Law and 
Economics, and the Law and 
Society Movement 
Although many of the ideas of the legal 
realists have been incorporated into the 
mainstream of law, there are three direct de-
scendants that persist as independent cur-
rents. One, called Critical Legal Studies, is 
a reincarnation of the Progressive political 
themes of Legal Realism, and the other two 
(the Law and Economics movement and the 
Law and Society movement) are develop-
ments of the interdisciplinary social science 
endeavor. 
Law and Economics scholars are fairly 
traditional in terms of economic theory 
[e.g., Tversky, Kahneman, and the behav-
ioral economists so far have had mini-
mal influence (Kahn em an & Tversky, 2000; 
Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Thaler, 
1992)], taking as given the assumption that 
people rationally assess their circumstances 
and do what will maximize their own wel-
fare. The potential criminal calculates the 
probabilities of getting caught, being pun-
ished, and the potential severity of pun-
ishment and weighs these considerations 
against the beneficial consequences of the 
crime (money, the extermination of a goal-
blocking person) and accordingly decides 
whether or not to commit the crime. They 
attempt to fit legal decisions into a stan-
dard economic framework and, if they do 
not fit, to argue that they should.5 Although 
they are often described as descendants of 
the legal realists, in some ways the Law 
and Economics movement bears a closer re-
semblance to the formalists. It has a for-
mal model with a set of first principles: "Be-
havior always takes the form of constrained 
maximization. The actor chooses from some 
specified set of options, selecting the option 
that maximizes some objective function. In 
orthodox theory, consumers have preferences 
that are represented by a utility function, 
and they choose in a way that maximizes 
their utility ... " (Kreps, 1990, p. 4, cited in 
Hanson & Yosifon, 2003). Explanations and 
recommendations follow deductively from 
the basic premises. Law and Economics has 
little to say about what is distinctive about 
legal reasoning; it is primarily another ex-
ample of the economic model of reasoning 
in general. 
By contrast, the Law and Society schol-
ars are open-minded, eclectic, and devoid 
of any theoretical mission. Instead, they are 
committed to the social science method of 
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inquiry and to the idea that history, culture, 
and social context matter. Friedman (1986) 
has proposed that Law and Society is a field 
like "Area Studies" in which scholars from 
many disciplines study law the way scholars 
from many disciplines study Latin America 
or Southeast Asia. Their concern with con-
text and actual behavior means that they 
are relatively uninterested in "purely intel-
lectual forces - the role of legal thinkers, for-
mal doctrine, philosophy and theory of law; 
the role of abstract ideas" (Friedman, 1986) 
because such forces are mainly epiphenom-
ena, not fundamentally causal. A great deal 
of important and interesting work has come 
from this school, but it is not really about 
legal reasoning in general. In fact Law and 
Society scholars would reject the idea that 
there is such a thing as legal reasoning in 
general. 
Critical Legal Studies is the bad boy of 
the bunch, and in this regard it is more ob-
viously connected to the Legal Realists in 
their role as iconoclastic rebels. Like the re-
alists, they argue that interpretation of the 
law is subjective, and they emphasize the 
role of power and political ideology more 
strongly than most of the realists. Like there-
alists, they have been more effective as crit-
ics than as authors of an alternative vision 
(Kennedy, 1997 ), and some of them have 
glorified "trashing" as a sufficient contribu-
tion (Tushnet, 1984). In some ways, they 
resemble the postmodernists of other disci-
plines, insisting that there is "no there there," 
that all legal concepts, like all other social 
concepts, are socially constructed (except of 
course for power and dominance). 
However, some of their analyses of le-
gal reasoning went beyond what the legal 
realists had produced. In arguing that the 
legal realists' decisions were based on per-
sonal and social values, not law, the legal 
realists didn't quite get at the process by 
which a judge's preference is turned into a 
legal justification. Is the judge's reference 
to the law or precedent a "noble lie" in 
Dworkin's (1986) terms, resorted to because 
personal preferences or partisan political 
preferences could never be publicly stated 
as good reasons for justifying a decision? 
Are judges simply unquestioningly follow-
ing the requirement that all decisions must 
be justified by legal authority and precedent? 
Or are they totally unaware of their own 
biases? 
Duncan Kennedy, one of the founders of 
Critical Legal Studies, draws on the psychol-
ogy of Kohler, Lewin, and Piaget to explore 
the thought processes of judges in a way 
that is less fuzzy and more nuanced than 
the general realist point of view (Kennedy, 
1986). His hypothetical judge is a politi-
cal reformist, of course, who is faced with 
a conflict between what the law seems to 
require and "how I want it to come out": 
"imagine that I think the rule that seems to 
apply is bad because it strikes the wrong 
balance between two identifiable conflict-
ing groups, and does so as part of a gener-
ally unjust overall arrangement that includes 
many similar rules, all of which ought in the 
name of justice to change" (Kennedy, 1986, 
p. 519). The judge may reinterpret the facts, 
reinterpret the legal precedents, reinterpret 
the basic purpose of the law in the light of 
social policy, or make other moves. Judges 
will also consider how the public and other 
judges will view their decision, and finally, 
they really do care about the law and prece-
dent; thus, the dilemma is a real cognitive 
dilemma, not just a matter of imposing their 
personal political motives. The decision will 
become part of the law that other judges 
must consider when they decide cases, so 
the judge also must worry about its future 
ramifications. "Legal argument is the process 
of creating the field of law through restate-
ment rather than rule application" (Kennedy, 
1986, p. 562). The thought process evolves 
in time, beginning as a conflict and ending 
as certainty. Once a strategy is chosen, the 
judge no longer can imagine any compelling 
counterargument. Simon recently updated 
this analysis in the light of more recent re-
search in social and cognitive psychology and 
showed that it has considerable power even 
in cases in which the judge has no particular 
political motivation: An incoherent mass of 
contradictions develops into a coherent de-
cision in which no opposing argument carries 
any weight, but all turn out upon close ex-
amination to support the decision (Simon, 
1998). 
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Of course these biases - hindsight, hy-
pothesis confirmation, motivated informa-
tion processing, ultimate overconfidence, 
and others - are not unique to legal rea-
soners. They are true of us all, including 
scientists. Still, there are several important 
differences between legal reasoning and sci-
entific reasoning. 
Differences Between Scientific 
Reasoning and Legal Reasoning 
As Llewellyn said, legal reasoning is not sci-
entific reasoning, although it shares some an-
alytic strategies, most notably the "method 
of comparison and difference" (Llewellyn, 
1930, p. 43) or, as we might say, "conver-
gent and discriminant validity" (Campbell & 
Fiske, 19 59) and the technique of simultane-
ously considering alternative explanations or 
"multiple working hypotheses" (Chamber-
lin, 1890; Campbell & Stanley, 1966). In fact, 
the legal decision maker in an adversarial sys-
tem is forced to consider at least two com-
peting hypotheses proposed by the parties. 
In this sense, the judge has some marginal 
protection against the thoughtless hypothe-
sis confirmation to which scientists occasion-
ally fall prey. This is not to say that judges 
are immune from hypothesis-confirming bi-
ases, only that at the beginning of the process 
they are forced to consider at least two rival 
hypotheses. 
Nonetheless, the judge and the scientist 
have different tools available to them, dif-
ferent constraints, and different goals. Sci-
ence demands no final decisions; it is an on-
going process. If the evidence is murky, sci-
entists can wait, can reserve judgment until 
they can conduct further research. And they 
can figure out what further research needs to 
be done to answer the question, and do it. 
Judges can neither reserve judgment nor go 
beyond the data presented in court, how-
ever ambiguous those data might be. They 
cannot carry out further research, nor wait 
until others have done so; they must decide. 
And the judge's decision, whether the ev-
idence is conclusive or completely inade-
quate, has the same precedential force. It is 
final. The scientist's conclusions are never fi-
nal, always tentative. 
The judge must also decide for one side 
or the other; the scientist's decision that the 
truth lies somewhere between the extreme 
points of view is typically not available to 
the judge. As I will argue, these role con-
straints in legal reasoning encourage cate-
gorical thinking and a corresponding distrust 
of probabilistic reasoning, overconfidence, 
and a strong dispositional bias in which 
situational factors and attributional biases 
are overlooked, and the idea of free will is 
preserved. 
Lack of Opportunity for Empirical Testing 
Scientists and judges must both decide be-
tween competing explanations. But when 
scientists are trying to decide among rival 
hypotheses, or even when testing a single hy-
pothesis, sooner or later they put the ques-
tion to nature. They design a study that will 
create new information, information that is 
not already in the system, that will help them 
to answer the question and to move forward 
in the way they think about the issues. In 
legal reasoning, there is no empirical op-
tion. Judges must work with the information 
given to them, and that information consists 
entirely of what other people have said and 
the judge's own knowledge. Judges listen to 
testimony and arguments and read the law, 
scholarly works, and the opinions of other 
judges; they arrange and rearrange these el-
ements, selecting, interpreting, and looking 
for a rule that "holds good for the matter at 
hand" (Llewellyn, 1930, p. 72). The conclu-
sion that the judge finally reaches is not em-
pirically tested and cannot be disconfirmed. 
Of course, the judge may consider empir-
ical data as part of the factual evidence in a 
case. Most cases involve experts of one sort 
or another- some who present the results of 
diagnostic tests (e.g., of bullets, blood, dan-
gerousness, mental illness, almost anything 
you can think of), some who present there-
sults of empirical work specifically related 
to the case (e.g., contamination of the jury 
pool through pretrial publicity, evidence of 
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racial discrimination in a company's promo-
tion policies), some who describe the results 
of general research that is germane to the 
issue (e.g., evidence that some substance in-
creases the risk of cancer, or of factors affect-
ing the reliability of eyewitness testimony). 
The legal realists would be pleased about this 
increasing prevalence of social science evi-
dence in legal decision making, but the judge 
does not collect new evidence. 
The scientist is searching for truth. The 
judge wants to get the facts right, but that 
is not the whole task. The judge also wants 
to settle the dispute in a way that is consis-
tent with the law and the decisions in pre-
vious disputes and that is just. So it could 
be argued that the whole concept of an em-
pirical test of the final decision is irrelevant, 
that there is no empirical test of justice. 
If two scientists make opposite predictions, 
someone will do a study to try to choose 
between them or otherwise clarify the ques-
tion. If a judge makes a decision, it is fi-
nal unless it is appealed. If it is appealed, 
the appellate court rarely re-examines the 
facts and certainly does not invite new evi-
dence but decides whether the lower court 
made a legal (procedural) error (Mathieson 
& Gross, 2004). The final decision is the 
decision of the majority, and a five to four 
decision in the Supreme Court has the same 
precedential authority as a unanimous de-
cision. When the Court is split four to four, 
the views of the ninth, "swing" Justice decide 
the case and can have precedential force -
even if those views are quite idiosyncratic 
(e.g., Johnson v. Louisiana, 1972; Regents of 
the University of California v. Bakke, 1978). 
Need for an Immediate, Final Decision 
Unlike the judge, the scientist can reserve 
judgment and can say that, given the mud-
dled state of the current evidence, there are 
many questions that we can't answer yet and 
that further research is necessary. The judge 
has to decide, and usually he has to decide 
one way or the other, without the range of 
compromise solutions that are often avail-
able to the scientist. Just as judges cannot 
create new information by conducting em-
pirical research, they cannot wait for new 
information before making a decision. 
When the courts use available scientific 
data in reaching a decision, this finality can 
be a source of frustration to scientific re-
searchers. In 1970, the Supreme Court held 
that the size of a jury (six versus twelve 
members) does not affect its functioning 
(Williams v. Florida, 1970), and in 1972, it 
held that deliberation would be just as thor-
ough in juries that were not required to 
reach a unanimous verdict as in those that 
were (Johnson v. Louisiana, 1972; Apodaca 
et al. v. Oregon, 1972). In the early 197os, 
when these decisions were handed down, 
there was almost no research on the ef-
fects of group size or the unanimity require-
ment. Social scientists were stunned that 
such important decisions could be made on 
the basis of so little information, and a flood 
of studies and commentaries quickly fol-
lowed, many of them suggesting that twelve-
person, unanimous juries deliberate more 
thoroughly than six-person or nonunani-
mous juries (Lempert, 197 5; Saks & Ostrum, 
1975; Zeisel, 1971, on jury size; Hastie, 
Penrod, & Pennington, 1983, on unanimity). 
However, the Court had already held that 
neither the size of the jury nor the una-
nimity requirement affected deliberations, 
and that six-person and nonunanimous ju-
ries were constitutional. Although it is cer-
tainly true that in science bad research can 
exert a baleful influence on the field for far 
longer than it should (because the finding is 
exciting, or because it is what people want to 
believe, or because the researcher is very fa-
mous, or for various other reasons), it doesn't 
have the same force as legal precedent. It 
is more acceptable and less costly for a sci-
entist to reject a theory than for a judge 
to overturn a previous precedent. Authority 
matters in law; in science nothing enhances 
a career more than a convincing refutation 
of authority. 
Still, there have been cases in which 
the Supreme Court has expressed a more 
provisional, scientific point of view. In 
Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) the Court 
had before it sketchy evidence based on 
three unpublished studies suggesting that 
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excluding opponents of the death penalty 
from juries in capital cases (the common 
practice known as "death qualification") bi-
ased the jury toward a guilty verdict, and 
so when a defendant's life was at stake he 
would face a greater risk of conviction than 
he would if the prosecutor had not asked for 
the death penalty. The Court decided that 
the research was, as yet, "too tentative and 
fragmentary" to reject death-qualification as 
unconstitutional but that future data might 
justify such a move. From a scientific point 
of view, such a holding is far more accept-
able than a holding that said, "We have re-
viewed the evidence and we conclude that 
death-qualification does not create a bias and 
therefore is constitutional," which would be 
analogous to the Williams holding on jury 
size. From a practical point of view, how-
ever, leaving a question open invites more 
litigation, and if the practice later is found 
to be unconstitutional, there is the problem 
of retroactivity- that is of what to do about 
all those people who were convicted by bi-
ased, death-qualified juries. 
Categorical Thinking, Lack of 
Compromise, and Certainty 
The need to decide the particular case one 
way or the other also pushes legal reasoning 
toward categorical thinking: A person is ei-
ther sane (guilty) or insane (not guilty); an 
unfit parent (someone else gets the child) or 
fit (he or she may get the child); a future 
danger to society (execution permitted) or 
not (execution not permitted, barring other 
aggravating factors). Psychologists consider 
sanity, fitness, and dangerousness to be con-
tinuous variables with no great gulf between 
the sane and the insane, the fit and the un-
fit, the safe and the dangerous, and many 
intermediate cases. But a legal case has to be 
decided for one party or the other, and so 
variables that are continuous are forced to 
become dichotomous. Sometimes there are 
more than two categories (first-degree mur-
der, second-degree murder, and manslaugh-
ter), but a line must always be drawn. 
The fact that the decision must be 
categorical very likely exercises an influence 
on the process of legal reasoning itself 
Compromise decisions are usually impossi-
ble, and in an adversary system, the judge 
is faced with two attorneys, each making 
the strongest possible case for diametrically 
opposed outcomes and thus minimizing any 
ambiguities.6 Experts may agree on most 
of the data in their field, but those are not 
the data that make for effective adversarial 
persuasion; thus, they are not likely to be 
presented in court, and the judge or jury is 
not likely to get a sense of how much con-
sensus actually exists. The attorneys do their 
best to make every fact and every precedent 
fit their argument, trying to make it look 
as though the field is "impacted" (Kennedy, 
1986), with little room for doubt, and that 
everything about this case places it clearly 
on one side of the line. The combination of 
adversarial presentation and the need for a 
dichotomous decision may eventually make 
the legal reasoning of judges resemble that 
of advocates. The facts and law may begin by 
seeming to be a mass of contradictions, and 
the judge may be plagued by "the doubts 
and misgivings, the hope and fears" (Car-
dozo, 1921, p. 167) common in significant 
enterprises that are fraught with uncertainty 
and ambiguity; however, judicial opinions 
almost never suggest that there was ever any 
uncertainty. Once the judge realizes which 
way he will probably decide the case and 
the rudiments of the justifications, "one of 
the effects ... is a kind of tunnel vision: One 
is inside the strategy, sensitive to its internal 
economy, its history of trade-offs, attuned 
to developing it further but at least tem-
porarily unable to imagine any other way to 
go" (Kennedy, 1986, p. 543). As in normal 
memory processes, strong pressures toward 
consistency and coherence arise, and the ar-
guments and evidence that initially seemed 
to favor the other side evaporate. "This sense 
of unequivocal support for the one decision 
generates a sense of inevitability, of singular 
correctness" (Simon, 1998, p. 84), and judi-
cial opinions are generally written as though 
all arguments support the conclusion, and 
there is no uncertainty whatever. Simon 
attributes this movement toward certainty 
to basic cognitive processes, and certainly 
this form of thinking is not unique to law; 
it is however exaggerated, I think, by the 
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adversarial presentation of evidence (with 
little or no attention to the ambiguous, in-
between facts and law) and by the necessity 
of always having to choose one side. 
The feeling that there must be a cer-
tain outcome, and that expressions of uncer-
tainty by a judge are a sign of weakness or 
incompetence (Simon, 1998, p. 12) seem 
quite bizarre in a world in which the basic 
insights of the legal realists are widely ac-
cepted. But it is real. Despite the fact that 
majority and dissenting justices are perfectly 
certain (so presumably either one side is 
dead wrong or there is some uncertainty), 
and despite the fact that everyone knows 
that as soon as the next case comes along 
"the legal materials lose their recently ac-
quired character, and return to their ambigu-
ous existence within the world of multiple 
meanings" (Simon, 1998, p. 127), nonethe-
less certainty is still valued as some sort of 
mastery and uncertainty as a sign of indeci-
siveness at best and incompetence at worst. 
The decision must be justified in terms of 
the law, and it would be dangerous, in law 
as in chess or sports, to suggest that the law 
itself is ambiguous. 
Mistrust of Probabilistic Thinking 
and Aggregate Data 
This concern with certainty and the need 
to make dichotomous judgments may help 
explain why judges and legal scholars 
are often uncomfortable with probabilistic 
statements and probabilistic data. Scientists 
regularly make explicit quantified probabil-
ity judgments; lawyers and judges do not -
certainly not about the ultimate issues. For 
example, they strongly resist placing a nu-
merical value on the "reasonable doubt" 
standard: Is it 95% certainty, 99% certainty? 
Jurors are generally just given the stock 
phrase, sometimes supplemented by other 
phrases, such as "to a moral certainty" or 
"firmly convinced." 
This hesitation to consider probabilities is 
not unreasonable given that the judge has to 
make a yes or no decision about a particular 
individual. The judge's task is more analo-
gous to that of a doctor or clinical psycholo-
gist than to that of a research scientist, and it 
is no accident that psychiatrists and clinical 
psychologists had close ties to the legal sys-
tem long before research psychologists did. 
Explaining (or predicting) the behavior of a 
specific individual in a specific set of circum-
stances is not what most scientists do and not 
what statistics are designed for. Experts will-
ing to testify to the exact probability that a 
given defendant will commit a future crime 
are viewed as charlatans by the scientific 
community. However, statistical probabilis-
tic data may be quite useful in illuminating 
other questions that judges must consider, 
such as whether a company is guilty of dis-
crimination in hiring or whether a particular 
drug causes birth defects. These questions 
are typically addressed with aggregate data 
in which the results of many different stud-
ies involving many different people are pro-
vided by an expert. Judges have become far 
·more receptive to statistical, empirical, ag-
gregate studies over the past fifty years, but 
there is still a core reluctance. Experts who 
testify about the factors affecting eyewitness 
reliability often have to overcome a certain 
judicial skepticism about the value of their 
testimony because they have not examined 
this particular eyewitness but are only talk-
ing about the circumstances that affect most 
eyewitnesses most of the time. Large-scale 
studies of pervasive racial discrimination in 
capital sentencing (Baldus, Woodworth, & 
Pulaski, 1990; Gross & Mauro, 1989) were 
rejected by the Supreme Court in McCleskey 
vs. Kemp (1987) in part because the ap-
pellant had not shown that the particular 
jury that tried McCleskey was influenced 
by racial bias. The Court held that in order 
to succeed with a claim of racial discrimi-
nation, an appellant must prove either ( 1) 
"that the decision makers in his case acted 
with discriminatory purpose" [emphasis in 
original], or ( 2) "that the Georgia legislature 
enacted or maintained the death penalty 
statute because of an anticipated racially dis-
criminatory effect" [emphasis in original] 
(McCleskey vs. Kemp, 1987, p. 1769). 
Free Will and the Dispositional Bias 
Aggregate data are threatening in another 
way; they imply that many people in the 
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same circumstances would behave in the 
same way and thereby threaten the notion 
of autonomy and free will so deeply rooted 
in the minds of legal thinkers. The law sees 
behavior as caused by people's beliefs, de-
sires, and preferences. Ideas of free choice 
and free will are still fundamental to legal 
thinking and largely unquestioned. This em-
phasis creates another source of tension be-
tween law and the social sciences because 
social science takes a much more determin-
istic point of view, emphasizing cultural, so-
ciological, psychological, biological, and, es-
pecially in psychology, situational forces on 
behavior (Ross and Nisbett, 1991). The fact 
that economics is the social science that has 
been most successful in law schools is not 
surprising given this model; of all the social 
sciences, economics is the one most wedded 
to a free choice theory of behavior. 
The law has developed a highly elaborate 
set of definitions of various degrees of per-
sonal responsibility, including deliberation, 
intention, knowledge, recklessness, and neg-
ligence, but has been relatively untouched 
by psychological research on attributional 
biases and particularly by the research on 
the dispositional bias (fundamental attribu-
tion error) or by social psychological re-
search demonstrating that situations play a 
far greater role than personal preferences 
and dispositions in determining people's be-
havior (Ross & Nisbett, 1991). When situa-
tional forces are considered, such as in the 
concepts of necessity and duress, the situ-
ations are generally so extreme as to be ir-
relevant to everyday life - a person breaks 
into a lonely cabin in a blizzard because 
he is freezing to death or signs a contract 
because someone is holding a gun to her 
head - and can be taken as the exceptions 
that prove the rule that the pervasive power 
of the situation in all aspects of our lives 
is largely ignored by the law (Hanson & 
Yosifon, 2003; Ross & Shestowsky, 2003). 
The validity of the concept of free will has 
in fact troubled a sprinkling of legal schol-
ars for a century (Pound, Green, Hanson), 
and these doubts have occasionally influ-
enced sentencing practices but have rarely 
affected the basic attribution of guilt or lia-
bility. Even when exceptions are made, they 
generally are made on the basis of internal, 
dispositional factors (e.g., insanity, youth) 
and rarely on the basis of situational forces. 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
Legal reasoning is a form of expert reason-
ing. Einstein argued that expert reasoning -
in particular, scientific reasoning - is "noth-
ing but a refinement of our everyday think-
ing" (1936, in Bargmann [trans.] 1954, p. 
290 ). Like everyday problem solving and sci-
entific reasoning, legal reasoning begins by 
examining a set of facts and figuring out 
what happened and why. Of course, some 
of the "facts" may be fictions, and the judge 
must decide which to believe and which to 
reject, but that is true of all natural prob-
lem solving. Information is selected and re-
jected as part of the process of creating a 
coherent story. 
It is the "refinements" that make one form 
of expert reasoning different from another. 
Like other forms of expert reasoning, the 
law has its own terminology, its own uni-
verse of acceptable data, and its own rules. 
In law, the rules are more flexible than they 
are in some domains and more central than 
they are in most. They are more flexible than 
the rules of chess, for example, because in 
complex cases there are often many possible 
rules and precedents from which to choose, 
and both the facts and the rules can be inter-
preted and reinterpreted in relation to each 
other until the judge is satisfied with the to-
tal combination - satisfied with the fitness 
or coherence of the overall picture, and sat-
isfied that the decision is just. 
The rules are more central in that every 
decision must be justified by explicit dis-
cussion of the relevant rules: The rules are 
not just a framework for decision making; 
they are an essential part of the process. 
The sine qua non of empirical scientific re-
search is a clear description of the research 
method. The judge has a mass of materials 
to work with, ranging from the incoherent, 
self-serving blabbering of a witness to the 
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decisions of other judges to the Constitution 
itself, and the sine qua non of legal reason-
ing is the explanation of why this decision 
is the right one (Schauer, 1995), an expla-
nation ultimately expressed as argument. 
This explanation "is meant not only to jus-
tify the judgment in terms of an authorita-
tive past but to constitute an authority to 
be referred to in the future" (White, 1985, 
p. 240). 
Despite the major developments in le-
gal scholars' interpretations oflegal reasoning 
over the past century and a half, legal rea-
soning itself has not changed substantially, 
and it is unlikely to do so in the near future. 
Law is a socially defined and socially con-
structed system that is generally seen as serv-
ing its purposes well. Undoubtedly there will 
be further changes in the nature of the fac-
tual evidence judges consider relevant with 
increasing attention to general scientific re-
search, but the form of legal reasoning, the 
rules of the game, cannot change without 
major changes in the system itself, and there 
is no indication of any such changes in the 
near future. 
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Notes 
1. European civil law systems differ from com-
mon law systems in many respects, such as a 
more active role for the trial court judge, less 
emphasis on precedent, and reconsideration of 
the facts at the appellate level. They are be-
yond the scope of this chapter. 
2. This section owes much to the work of Robert 
Gordon (1984), Duncan Kennedy (1973), and, 
especially, Thomas C. Grey (1983). 
3. In the era of formalism, judges were men, so I 
refer to them as "he." For the sake of balance, 
I refer to scientists as she. 
4. By this time, Holmes had been on the Supreme 
Court for many years, and Pound had become 
more conservative and more prosaic. 
5. Of course there are exceptions, and a brief de-
scription like this one must always be, in some 
ways, a caricature. 
6. In actuality, compromise is pervasive in the 
legal system, because most civil cases are re-
solved by settlement and most criminal cases 
by plea bargain. The study of legal reasoning, 
however, focuses on the small minority of cases 
that are litigated and decided by judges. 
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